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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether the effect of funding liquidity on financial stability changes 
depending upon bank regulation and bank size, using bank-level data for 254 banks in 
BRICS over the period 2005-2014. The paper employs the system GMM techniques on 
dynamic panel analysis. The results show that the effect of funding liquidity on financial 
stability is positively and negatively associated with bank regulation and bank size, 
respectively, suggesting that bank regulation improves the financial stability, while the size 
hurts the stability. Moreover, the impact of funding liquidity on stability is strongly 
pronounced following the 2008 crisis. These findings provide further insights about bank 
regulation and bank size. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The worldwide financial crisis has re-opened a discussion among regulators and academics concerning the 
soundness and safety of the banking system. Again, it has been highlighted the critical importance of bank size 
and funding liquidity in the financial stability of the banking industry. There are a number of reasons why this 
heated discussion takes place. Firstly, bank size was a key determinant of risk since large banks, in particular, 
have been considered as the root of the financial crisis (Laeven et al., 2016). Secondly, funding liquidity is the 
risk factor. It increases substantially excessive risk-taking which leads to the banking fragility (Khan et al., 
2017).  Because funding liquidity, which denotes the bank’s ability to pay the depositors’ claims with 
immediacy,  has a direct influence on the banking stability. The motive is that banks are the most leveraged 
institutions and managers’ pay packages are much stronger at banks as compared to non-financial firms (Uhde, 
2016). In fact, bank managers tend to take higher risks as their compensations are based on the loan volumes 
instead of their commitments. They are penalized because of their lack of efforts only in the case that banks 
encounter a severe liquidity shortfall (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). Bank mangers can transfer risk to dispersed 
and unsophisticated borrowers (Uhde, 2016). It is worth noting that level of funding liquidity depends upon 
macroeconomic risk as the investors restrict direct investment and hold more bank deposits. As a result, the high 
level of funding liquidity motivates banks to take excessive credits and protect the potential decreases of their 
payoffs due to downside risks, leading to the  financial fragility (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). Thirdly, the merits 
of bank regulation and supervision have been underscored as a means to mitigate any potential economic 
instability (Klomp and De Haan, 2012).  
Understanding how the effect of funding liquidity on financial stability varies depending upon bank 
regulation and supervision and bank size is central issue because a limited number of studies have investigated 
the impact of funding liquidity on financial stability and whether the effect of funding liquidity on financial 
stability differs depending on bank regulations and bank size. Banking theory posits that there is the strong 
association between the bank's assets and liabilities producing financial services which induce liquidity risk and 
credit risk simultaneously (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Another theory, the too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis postulates that large banks tend to take excessive risks  for two reasons: first, the regulators are not 
willing  to put  restrictions to a bank's activities that may lead to moral hazard and second banks may invest 
risky assets, expecting government bailouts in case they encounter failure (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). From 
empirics,  interrelations between bank size and financial stability thus far reached few firm conclusions. Some 
studies argue that financial instability grows with bank size (Laeven et al., 2016). Bank size should be downsized 
for the avoidance of risk (De Jonghe et al., 2015). In contrast, bank size is positively associated with stability of 
banking system, suggesting that large banks exploit scale of economies that hence reduce excessive risk-taking 
and enhance more efficient intermediation improving bank stability (Moutsianas and Kosmidou, 2016).  
Funding liquidity has been identified as a critical factor undermining a more resilient banking industry 
during the financial crisis (Khan et al., 2017). Studies that have focused on the interactions between bank size 
and financial stablitity.However, the interaction effect of funding liquidity and bank regulation on financial 
stability is significantly unclear. To our knowledge, this empirical investigation is the first study that accounts 
for  effects of bank regulation and supervision and bank size when interacted with funding liquidity on financial 
stablity. 
Therefore, this paper examines  the interaction effects of funding liquidity, bank regulation and bank size 
on financial stablitity of banks in BRICS countries. The decision concerning research for BRICS countries is 
somewhat obvious because the BRICS countries are considered as key players in the world economy and their 
increasingly important role in the world economy is related to trade, growth, and population (Demir and Ersan, 
2017; Mensi et al., 2014). For example, in last two decades, their shares of global trade and investment have 
grown at ferocious space, making the region to be more integrated with the rest of world (Mensi et al., 2014). 
In world trade, their exports and imports are accounted to be increased nearly in triple and double respectively. 
The population of the region which is estimated 41% of the world population live 28.4% of world territory and 
(Demir and Ersan, 2017; Mensi et al., 2014). The BRICS countries enjoy more than 1 billion labor people. 
Regarding share of global output, the region's economic growth has increased from approximately 7% to almost 
22% in the last two decades, implying that the BRICS holds the second largest GDP of the global economic 
output after U.S (Demir and Ersan, 2017). Notably, the growth of BRICS is expected to surpass the U.S. after 
2020 (Demir and Ersan, 2017). Moreover, investment, especially FDI has reached its peak with 294 in 2013  
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and BRICS will hold more than 40% of the capitalization of world stock by 2030 (Balcilar et al., 2018). To 
investigate these interactions, we use unbalanced panel data over the period between 2005 and 2014 of banks 
in Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa, known as BRICS countries to identify whether 
the effects of funding liquidity on financial stability change depending upon the bank regulations and bank size. 
The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we extend the existing literature by identifying the 
determinants that influence the financial stability of intermediation system. This helps regulators and 
governments to determine key variables that enhance or undermine financial stability in emerging economies. 
Second, we investigate the effect of bank regulation on the association between funding liquidity and financial 
stability in BRICS countries. Such bank regulation encapsulates capital stringency, supervisory power, activity 
restrictions, and private monitoring and their essence widely discussed in the literature (J.R. Barth et al., 2013b). 
Finally, we employ system GMM techniques to reduce the potential bias affecting the results from the 
interrelationships among bank size, funding liquidity, and financial stability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the related literature review, and 
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and briefly presents data and variables. Section 4 shows the 
regression results and discussion of the baseline model and the extended model. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Funding liquidity refers the ability of a bank to increase cash on short notice, while the funding liquidity risk is 
denoted as the banks’ inability to obtain funds in case of need (Strahan, 2010).  Several recent empirical and 
theoretical studies have elevated the comprehension of bank practices in funding liquidity. This research is 
related to the current literature on funding liquidity (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Khan et al., 2017; Mohamed et 
al., 2018; Umar et al., 2016). Unlike to this paper, many studies have investigated risk factors that undermine 
the stability of banking system and found bank size and funding liquidity as risk determinants that caused the 
financial instability (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Laeven et al., 2016). This paper adopts two theories, namely 
banking theory, and the too-big-to-fail theory. Firstly, banking theory posits that banks with the high level of 
funding liquidity tend to engage more in excessive risk-taking activities (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Banks 
generally attract funds from depositors and provide loans to borrowers. This increases funding liquidity which 
induces the bank to undertake activities which are inherent in risks, such as liquidity risk and credit risk (Broll 
et al., 2015). However, if banks are unable to settle the depositors’ claims with immediacy, banks face funding 
liquidity risk. To this end, banks are more vulnerable to liquidity shortages which then causes fire sales resulting 
in banking instability (Gennaioli et al., 2013; Kashyap et al., 2002; Laeven et al., 2016; Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010).  Second, the too-big-to-fail theory postulates that the bank regulators are unwilling to downsize large 
and complex banks. Due to moral hazard, banks have incentives for more risks by expecting government 
bailouts (Laeven et al., 2016). Besides, large banks can get liquidity assistance from central banks when they 
face financial distress (Distinguin et al., 2013). 
A number of studies have focused on the association between funding liquidity and bank risk-taking. Khan 
et al. (2017)  use U.S bank holding companies to examine the effect of funding liquidity on bank risk-taking 
over the period 1986-2014,  their results document that bank risk-taking is significantly and positively associated 
with funding liquidity, implying higher the funding liquidity risk, banks take more risk which results in financial 
instability. In the same vein, Mohamed et al. (2018) investigate the relationship between funding liquidity and 
bank risk-taking, using BRICS banks over the period 2006-2015, they find that the relationship is significantly 
positive. Besides, the theoretical model developed by Acharya and Naqvi (2012) has been employed in the 
current literature on funding liquidity-bank risk-taking relation argues that whenever funding liquidity increases, 
it encourage bank managers to take excessive risk, which results in financial stability. However, Vazquez and 
Federico (2015)  focused on the relationship between funding liquidity and financial stability. Their results 
indicate that banks with less funding liquidity before the crisis have failed at the onset of the recent financial 
crisis. They highlighted the importance of funding liquidity that improves the safety and soundness of the 
banking sector. Notable banks with less funding liquidity have failed, while those with greater funds performed 
better during the crisis. More importantly, the findings show that large international banks were more than stable  
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than the domestic banks as they have many funds. The reason is attributed to that the foreign banks have more 
accessibility in funding liquidity.  
From the market perspective, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) use insurance premium as a proxy for 
funding liquidity risk to study the association between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. Using  
European countries and monthly data for the period from June 2005 to October  2008, the results indicate that 
the funding liquidity risk was stable and slightly low coupled with the temporal spikes. Furthermore, the results 
unveil that liquidity spirals have been declining. Boudt et al. (2017) use a theoretical model that posits 
interrelationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity concerning stabilization to investigate the 
determinants(i.e., market liquidity and volatility)  of funding liquidity, and their results show that both market 
liquidity and volatility endogenize funding liquidity. 
Other bank-specific variables that influence banking stability include bank size. However, the bank size 
and its relation with the financial stability of the banking industry is ambiguous. Large banks were cited as the 
root of the financial crisis because they generally tend to have excessive risk-taking behavior. To this end, the 
bank size undermines the stability of the banking sector. Laeven et al. (2016) find that large banks are positively 
correlated with risk, reducing financial stability. De Jonghe et al. (2015) suggest that bank size has a significant 
effect on increasing in potential systematic risk exposure. In contrast, Beccalli et al. (2015)  find that size is 
positively associated with banking stability, suggesting that large banks have greater economies of scale. In fact, 
these banks enhance risk management by using diversification and franchise value. 
Furthermore, various studies shed light on the role of bank regulation on bank risk-taking. Bank regulation 
and supervision have emerged as a flagship that emphasizes the importance of global capital and liquidity rules 
that mitigate the risk of bank fragility and its related adverse macroeconomic developments and improve a more 
resilient banking system (Deli and Hasan, 2016; Klomp and De Haan, 2012). Thus, we analyze the effects of 
bank regulations on the relationship between the funding liquidity and financial stability, using banks in BRICS 
countries over the period 2005 -2014. To identify the regulatory dimensions, we develop indices for capital 
stringency, activity restrictions, supervisory power, and private monitoring  following the  previous literature 
that focused on bank regulations (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2017; Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Luo et al., 2016; Noman 
et al., 2018). 
To sum up, the previous literature at both empirical and theoretical level indicate that funding liquidity 
may likely influence the financial stability of the banking system. However, the interaction funding liquidity, 
bank size, and bank regulation remain unclear.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Empirical model 
The paper estimates our empirical analysis, the first model considers the effect of funding liquidity on financial 
stability, while the other two accounts for interaction terms of bank regulation and bank size respectively. To 
this end, we specify the following equations: 
                                                                       
ititiititit FLQTBTB    XSS 1110  
(1) 
 
The paper extends the model by incorporating interactions to examine whether bank regulation and bank 
size affect the relationship between funding liquidity and financial stability. The  interaction models are as 
follows: 
 
ittiitiititititit REGFLQREGFLQTB    XSSTB 13121110  
(2) 
ittiitiititititit LSZFLQLSZFLQTB    XSSTB 13121110  
(3) 
 
Where STBit represents bank stability, FLQit is funding liquidity, LSZit is bank size, REGit is bank 
regulation, Xit is a set of bank-specific and country variables.  
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it  is the error term which is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and i represents unobserved bank-
specific effect and t  is time-specific effect. 
Bank stability (STBit)which serves as the dependent variable has a measure of z-score literature (Laeven 
et al., 2016; Lepetit and Strobel, 2013). It is calculated as the sum of return on assets and the capital to total 
assets divided by the standard deviation of returns [(ROA+ETA)/𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴]. The volatility of return (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴) is 
calculated as a 3-year rolling window standard deviation of ROA. We employ the natural logarithm of z-score 
following Laeven and Levine (2009)  to deal with upward bias which means the value of z-score is 
overestimated. In doing so, the log of z-score refers stability which is inversely proportional to the bank's 
insolvency and interpretation is more meaningful when it is used as a dependent variable in regression models. 
Funding liquidity(FLQit) has a measure of deposits to total assets. Bank size (LSZit) has a proxy of the natural 
logarithm of banks' total assets. The bank-specific variables include the loan composition(LTAit) which is 
calculated as loans to total assets and profitability(ROAit) which is a ratio of net income to total assets. The 
country control variables contain economic growth (ΔGDPit) and inflation (ΔINFit). FCt is the dummy that 
represents the global financial crisis which takes the value of 1 for the year 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
Turning to bank regulation, capital stringency(CASit) is an index that measures a country's aggregate laws 
and rules of bank capital. Initial capital investigates whether specific sources, such as borrowed funds and assets 
excluded government securities may be used as the initial capital and whether regulatory or supervisory 
authorities officially verified them. Conversely, overall capital examines whether the calculation of regulatory 
capital reflects risk elements and market value losses deducted. The capital stringency is sourced from data 
developed by J.R. Barth et al. (2013b). The construction of index takes the scores ranging from 1 to 10. Notably, 
a higher score shows greater capital stringency, implying a buffer that, therefore,  reduces a bank's risk exposure, 
while a lower score reflects less capital stringency. The empirical literature examines the effect of capital 
stringency on financial stability provides positive results (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2017; Noman et al., 2018). This 
implies that capital stringency induces banks to be prudent by raising their levels of monitoring and controlling. 
It also prevents banks from taking risky investment portfolio that may likely lead to bankruptcy (Noman et al., 
2018). Therefore, we predict that there is a positive relationship between capital stringency and financial 
stability. Because the capital requirements that are mandated to banks imply the bank's equity is at risk, and any 
possible default costs are adjusted with the shareholders' equity. 
Activity restrictions(ACRit) measure bank activities that are restricted, and these include securities, 
insurance, real estate investment and ownership of non-financial companies. Banks tend to increase risk if they 
are permitted wide-ranging activities due to moral hazard(Klomp and De Haan, 2012).  The index takes the 
score from 0 to 16, with a higher score reflects greater stringency activity restriction. J. Barth et al. (2004) 
indicate that activity restrictions are negatively associated with bank stability and raise the probability of bank 
failures. Similarly, the current empirical literature documents a negative relationship between bank stability and 
activity restrictions (Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Noman et al., 2018). Thus, the negative correlation between 
capital stringency and financial stability is to be expected. 
Supervisory power(DSPit)  measures the power which supervisory authorities can exercise by taking 
corrective actions against bank management and declaring insolvency. Strong supervision can prevent bank 
managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking that undermines financial stability. However, the literature 
shows that strict supervisory may trigger corruption as supervisors exploit using their power (Luo et al., 2016). 
The index score varies from 1 to14; higher score reflects greater supervisory power while a lower score indicates 
less official supervisory power. Therefore, the expected relationship between financial stability and supervisory 
power is to be positive. 
Private monitoring(PRMit) measures the degree to which banks provide accurate and comprehensive 
information to public and officials and, in addition, requirements related to credit ratings as well as auditing. 
Overall the literature unveils a negative impact on moral hazard concerning asymmetric information and 
positive influence on financial stability (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2017; Klomp and De Haan, 2012). Thus, we expect 
that the private monitoring is positively associated with financial stability. 
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Estimation model  
We use two-step System GMM techniques proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to deal with potential 
endogeneity problems. We employ this dynamic panel approach because of its efficiency. This estimator is 
more suitable when panel data sample contains small T, and large N; the regressors are not exogeneous and the 
dependent variable is dynamic(persistent). Additionally, system GMM performs well even if there exist 
econometric issues, such as heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, time invariant fixed-effect which are more 
common in bank data-level data. The system GMM model allows using the first differences to eliminate the 
potential correlation between lagged dependent variable and error terms while instrumenting the predetermined 
and endogenous variables to reduce endogeneity issues by using lags. System GMM estimation combines two 
sets of equations. For instance, variables are differenced in the first equation, and lags of independent and 
explanatory variables are used as instruments. In the second equation, independent and explanatory variables 
are expressed in levels. However, instrument proliferation may reduce the power of the overidentification 
validity.  To overcome such issue, we limit the number of instruments to arrive a number of instruments which 
should be less than the number of banks (Roodman, 2009b). 
 
Data description  
We use bank accounting data which are sourced from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. Data regarding 
country control variables are extracted from World Development Indicators, and bank regulation is collected 
from a database developed by J.R. Barth et al. (2013b).  After received the data, the paper deliberately omitted 
the banks with their data observations are missing or represent a history of fewer than three years. As a result, 
the data turn unbalanced panel data covering 254 individual banks in five emerging countries, namely Brazil, 
Russia Federation, India, China, and South Africa which are abbreviated by BRICS. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 presents definitions and the summary statistics of all variables. The Pearson correlation matrix between 
the variables is reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Definition Expected Signs  Obs Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max VIF 
STBit Financial stability  2004 3.40 1.21 -3.33 1.53  
FLQit Funding liquidity (%) - 2156 77.39 16.59 8.30 94.80 3.01 
LSZit Bank size (log) +/- 1540 16.06 2.18 11.60 21.40 1.57 
ETAit Capital (%) +/- 2156 14.14 12.20 2.40 75.00 3.15 
LTAit Loan composition  (%) - 2156 54.31 20.78 1.10 95.00 1.22 
ROAit Profitability (%) +/- 2156 1.76 2.91 -5.10 14.40 1.25 
CASit Capital stringency + 2156 7.38 1.96 4.00 10.00 1.82 
ACRit Activity restrictions - 2156 7.00 2.17 4.00 11.00 3.31 
DSPit Supervisory power + 2156 9.98 2.55 6.00 14.00 1.91 
PRMit Private monitoring + 2156 8.19 1.34 6.00 11.00 2.34 
ΔGDPit GDP growth (%) + 2156 6.79 3.28 -7.80 12.70 1.74 
ΔINFit Change in consumer price index (%) - 2156 6.62 2.97 -0.70 15.50 1.68 
Note: Banking stability (STBit) with a measure of the natural logarithm of Z-score serves as the dependent variable. FLQit is funding 
liquidity; LSZit is bank size has a measure of the logarithm of total assets of banks and LTAit represents loans-to-total assets. ROAit is 
profitability with the proxy of net income divided by total assets. CARit is capital stringency, ACRit is activity restrictions, DSPit is a degree 
of supervisory power and PRMit is private monitoring. ΔGDPit is the growth of gross domestic product and ΔINFit is the change of consumer 
price index. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical specification. On an 
average, the mean value of funding liquidity(FLQit) is 77.39%, while the overall mean scores of capital(ETAit), 
loans-to-total assets (LTAit), and profitability(ROAit) are 14.14%, 54.31%, and 1.76% respectively. Also, their 
standard deviations are 16.59, 12.20, 20.78, and 2.91 accordingly. The mean values of bank stability (STBit) 
and bank size (LSZit) represent 3.40 and 16.06 respectively, whereas the standard deviation of bank stability is 
1.21, while bank size is 2.18. The mean values of capital stringency (CASit), activity restrictions (ACRit), 
supervisory power (DSPit), and private monitoring (PRMit) are 7.38, 7.00, 9.98 and 8.19, respectively and their  
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corresponding standard deviations are 1.96, 2.17, 2.55 and 1.34. Finally, the average values of growth of gross 
domestic product (ΔGDPit) and change of consumer price index (ΔINFit) are 4.37% and 6.78%, respectively 
which correspond to standard deviations of 3.28 and 2.97 accordingly. 
 
Table 2 Pairwise correlation analysis 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
STBit 1.00 
FLQit -0.10* 1.00 
ETAit 0.03 -0.54* 1.00 
LSZit -0.30* 0.29* -0.51* 1.00 
LTAit -0.12* 0.33* -0.25* -0.01 1.00 
ROAit 0.01 -0.46* 0.47* -0.16* -0.12* 1.00 
CASit -0.19* 0.28* -0.15* 0.31* 0.14* -0.03 1.00 
ACRit -0.30* 0.16* -0.12* 0.33* 0.04 0.04 0.55* 1.00 
DSPit -0.06* -0.09* -0.07* 0.10* -0.30* 0.06* -0.02 0.29* 1.00 
PRMit -0.26* -0.04 -0.04 0.29* -0.09* 0.06* 0.33* 0.53* 0.55* 1.00 
ΔGDPit -0.23* 0.13* -0.11* 0.21* 0.02 0.06* 0.46* 0.50* 0.21* 0.49* 1.00 
ΔINFit 0.17* -0.03 0.04 -0.19* 0.17* -0.05* -0.16* -0.45* -0.39* -0.53* -0.43* 1.00 
Note: * shows significance at the .05 level  
 
Table 2 shows that the correlation coefficients amongst regressors are below 0.6, indicating that there is 
less of a concern of multicollinearity. In other words, Table 1 also represents the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
which is less than the threshold value (10). As a result, inflation factor (VIF) confirms no sign of 
multicollinearity. The correlation between funding liquidity (FLQit), bank size (LSZit) and loans (LTAit) are 
negative and statistically significant at 5% significance level. However, the capital (ETAit) and profitability 
(ROAit) are positive but not statistically significant. The correlation coefficients of bank regulatory variables 
(i.e., CASit , ACRit, SUPit, and PRMit) are negative and significant, suggesting that countries with more bank 
regulations may likely promote fragility of the banking system. Last but not least, economic growth (ΔGDPit) 
and inflation (ΔINFit ) are statistically significant. 
 
Baseline regression results  
We investigate the linear relationship between funding liquidity and financial stability of banks in BRICS over 
the period from 2005 to 2014. Table 3 reports the empirical results of the baseline model in column 1 and four 
different measures of bank regulations individually in columns 2 to 5 and jointly in column 6. Notably, we 
employ two-step system GMM technique to address any potential endogeneity from reverse causality between 
financial stability and funding liquidity and regressors in the right-hand side of the empirical models (i.e., Eq.(2) 
and Eq.(3)). We use two lags of both dependent and explanatory variables as instruments to reduce endogeneity 
issues that arise from bias in the estimation of control variables. Moreover,we checked whether the use of these 
instruments make our model consistent and, in doing so, the results confirm the validity of the model as Sargan 
test and AR2 reject the null hypotheses of invalid instruments and presence of second-order serial correlation 
followed by number of instruments are less than number of banks(i.e.,  no. of group).  
The results show that lagged financial stability is statistically significant, confirming the persistence of 
lagged effects on financial stability. This ensures its dynamic effect suggesting that an increase in the past 
financial stability elevates the current financial stability level. In other words, the positive and significant 
coefficient of lagged financial stability of one year is to be carried forward to the following year, suggesting a 
bank’s persistent financial stability. 
 
Table 3 Funding liquidity and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STBit-1 0.452
*** 0.461*** 0.597*** 0.481*** 0.476*** 0.472*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FLQ it-1 -0.021
*** -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
LSZ it-1 -0.302
*** -0.326*** -0.152** -0.187*** -0.202*** -0.297*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.036] [0.009] [0.004] [0.000] 
ETA it-1 -0.054
*** -0.051*** -0.011 -0.012* -0.013* -0.051*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.147] [0.093] [0.081] [0.000] 
LTA it-1 -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 
 [0.893] [0.816] [0.155] [0.359] [0.268] [0.604] 
ROA it-1 -0.176
*** -0.186*** -0.188*** -0.206*** -0.210*** -0.177*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 4 Cont. 
ΔGDPit 0.011
* 0.012* 0.003 0.017** 0.019*** 0.099*** 
 [0.075] [0.058] [0.717] [0.028] [0.008] [0.008] 
ΔINFit -0.051
*** -0.049*** -0.010 -0.048*** -0.063*** -0.016** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.492] [0.000] [0.000] [0.041] 
CASit  0.093
***    0.051*** 
  [0.007]    [0.000] 
ACRit   0.134
***   -0.074 
   [0.001]   [0.188] 
DSPit    0.057
**  0.048 
    [0.037]  [0.138] 
PRMit     0.095
** 0.131** 
     [0.030] [0.018] 
Constant 4.804*** 4.646*** 2.251** 1.775* 1.622 2.817** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.049] [0.093] [0.149] [0.021] 
No. of observations 1037 1037 1036 1037 1037 1037 
No. of instruments 42 43 43 43 43 46 
No. of groups 224 224 225 224 224 224 
AR(1)test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)test(p-value) 0.9845 0.996 0.783 0.7591 0.6361 0.8862 
Sargan test(p-
value) 
0.1192 0.141 0.086 0.0719 0.0785 0.1237 
Note: Banking stability (STBit) with a proxy of the logarithm of z-score is used as the dependent variable. FLQit is funding liquidity with a 
measure of deposits to total assets; bank size (LSZit ) has a measure with the logarithm of banks' total assets; loan composition (LTA it) has 
the proxy of loans divided by total assets; profitability(ROAit) has a measure of net income to total assets and capital(ETAit) has a measure 
of equity to total assets. CAS is capital stringency, ACRit is activity restrictions, DSPit is supervisory power, and PRMit is private monitoring. 
ΔGDPit represents yearly economic growth rate, and ΔINFit stands for the inflation rate.  
* , ** and  *** represents statistical significance at  
10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The coefficients of funding liquidity are found to be negative and statistically significant at the 5 % level 
in all specifications. This shows that the funding liquidity is negatively associated with financial stability, 
indicating that banks with higher funding liquidity are likely to be less stable. Regarding the magnitude of 
coefficients, the estimates which have minor differences range from low 0.020 to high 0.031, suggesting that an 
increase in the funding liquidity reduces financial stability by  0.020 and 0.031. The result is in concordance 
with the theoretical prediction (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This finding implies that banks tend 
to take excessive risks. In fact, excessive risk-taking behavior per se is a risk determinant which hence leads to 
financial instability (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012).  
Regarding other bank-specific factors, most coefficients are statistically significant, with predicted signs. 
The bank size is negative and statistically significant at the 1 % significance level, implying that large banks are 
generally engaged in more risky investment, with the expectation of government bailout and liquidity assistance 
from the lender of last resort in the case of the financial stress (Distinguin et al., 2013). These findings are 
consistent with the too-big-to-fail theory (Farhi and Tirole, 2012) as well as the previous empirical studies 
(Ashraf et al., 2016; Laeven et al., 2016; Schwerter, 2011). The coefficients of bank capital and profitability 
enter significantly negative. The results indicate that financial stability is negatively correlated with profitability 
and is consistent with previous literature (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2017). Moreover, higher capital castigates bank 
activities and decreases the financial stability of the banking system, and this result is in line with the existing 
literature (Noman et al., 2018). However, the coefficients of loan composition which turn positive are not 
statistically significant. 
Turning to the bank regulation, coefficients are statistically significant in most specifications. Capital 
stringency(CAS) and private monitoring (PRM) are positively associated with financial stability in both 
individual and joint specifications, while the supervisory power(DSP) and activity restrictions(ACR) have 
positive effects on financial stability, but again the effects of latter are only significant for the individual 
specifications. On average, 1% increases in capital stringency and private monitoring improve financial stability 
by 0.093 and 0.095, respectively. Surprisingly, the joint model in column 6 shows the effect of private 
monitoring increases almost twice, while capital stringency decreases by approximately half as compared to 
individual specifications in columns 2 to 5. We also find that the supervisory power(DSP) and restrictions(ACR) 
are significantly positive in individual specifications, suggesting 1% increases in the supervisory power and 
activity restrictions enhance financial stability by 0.057 and 0.134 accordingly. Overall, the results indicate that 
the existence of regulations encourages banks to strengthen risk management. These are consistent with our 
previous predictions and, in addition,  they support literature (Ben Bouheni, 2014; Klomp and De Haan, 2012; 
Noman et al., 2018).  
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Considering country control variables, the coefficients of GDP growth enter significantly positive, 
suggesting that a higher growth rate of GDP causes financial stability, while inflation estimates are negatively 
associated with financial stability. This implies that the stability of the banking system is expected to be more 
improved when banks work in less inflation and stronger economic growth environment. The results are in line 
with our previous expectations and existing literature as well (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2017; Noman et al., 2018). 
 
Interaction results  
Table 4 reports the empirical results based on the use of interaction terms with bank size and regulations. The 
coefficients of bank size and bank regulations reflect the conditional influences of these factors on financial 
stability. Column 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the interaction effects of funding liquidity and bank size on financial 
stability. In columns 3 to 6, the four variables of bank regulations have interacted with funding liquidity. Column 
7 presents financial crisis interacted with funding liquidity. 
 
Table 5 Interaction effects of funding liquidity and financial stability 
 Bank size Bank regulations Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
STBit-1 0.418
*** 0.435*** 0.522*** 0.581*** 0.490*** 0.479*** 0.428*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FLQ it-1 -0.026
*** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.016** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.017*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] 
LSZ it-1 -0.232
*** -0.229*** -0.352*** -0.283*** -0.197*** -0.281*** -0.327*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] 
ETA it-1 -0.065
*** -0.065*** -0.018** -0.017** -0.012 -0.019*** -0.056*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.019] [0.103] [0.009] [0.000] 
LTA it-1 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.008
* 
 [0.226] [0.332] [0.116] [0.157] [0.446] [0.115] [0.081] 
ROA it-1 -0.187
*** -0.183*** -0.202*** -0.199*** -0.206*** -0.197*** -0.172*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ΔGDPit 0.021
** 0.020** 0.017** 0.010 0.015* 0.018** -0.002 
 [0.014] [0.023] [0.025] [0.172] [0.057] [0.014] [0.734] 
ΔINFit -0.066
*** -0.066*** -0.028** -0.026** -0.047*** -0.025** 0.067*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.025] [0.041] [0.000] [0.036] [0.000] 
FLQ× LSZit -0.001
** -0.001**      
 [0.035] [0.020]      
CASit  0.019 -0.133
*     
  [0.755] [0.081]     
FLQit× CASit   0.003
***     
   [0.001]     
ACRit  0.016  -0.080    
  [0.744]  [0.317]    
FLQit× ACRit    0.002
***    
    [0.009]    
SUPit  0.009   0.009   
  [0.852]   [0.721]   
FLQit× SUPit     0.001
**   
     [0.016]   
PRMit  0.037    0.021  
  [0.545]    [0.680]  
FLQit× PRMit      0.001  
      [0.371]  
FLQit× Crisist       -0.002
** 
       [0.030] 
Constant 5.192*** 4.567*** 4.861*** 3.833*** 1.814 3.895*** 5.067*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.101] [0.002] [0.000] 
No. of observations 999 999 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 
No. of instruments 43 47 44 44 44 44 43 
No. of groups 219 219 224 224 224 224 224 
AR(1):p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2):p-value 0.784 0.762 0.746 0.860 0.800 0.492 0.701 
Sargan test:p-value 0.082 0.102 0.135 0.118 0.078 0.074 0.211 
Note: Banking stability (STBit) with a proxy of the logarithm of z-score. FLQit is funding liquidity with a measure of deposits to total assets; 
bank size (LSZit) has a measure with the logarithm of banks' total assets; loan composition (LTA it) has the proxy of loans divided by total 
assets; profitability(ROA) has a measure of net income to total assets, and capital (ETA it) has a measure of equity to total assets. CASit is 
capital stringency, ACRit is activity restrictions, DSPit is supervisory power, and PRMit is private monitoring. ΔGDPit represents yearly 
economic growth rate, and ΔINFit stands for the inflation rate.  
* , ** and  *** represents statistical significance at  10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
We find that effect of funding liquidity and bank size is negatively associated with financial stability, with 
our previous expectation. A 1% increase in bank size raises the effect of funding liquidity on financial stability  
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by 0.001 in a year. In other words, a standard deviation rise in bank size elevates the impacts of the funding 
liquidity on financial stability by 0.00218 percentage points1. This implies that bank size weakens the financial 
stability. It is because banks engage in excessive risks, with expectation for a bailout in the case they face 
economic stress. The results are consistent with the literature (Laeven et al., 2016). 
In contrast, the coefficients of other interaction terms(i.e., bank regulations) in columns 3 to 6 are 
significantly positive, except for private monitoring which is found to be nonsignificant. In terms of magnitude, 
the interaction effects of funding liquidity and capital stringency, supervisory power, and activity restrictions 
on financial stability are 0.003, 0.002, 0.001, respectively. The results suggest that bank regulations have a 
significant effect on the relationship between funding liquidity and financial stability. More specifically, stricter 
capital stringency and strong supervisory power strengthen the financial stability. The most striking result to 
emerge from the finding is that the effect of funding liquidity on financial stability is positively associated with 
activity restrictions, implying freeing bank activities improves financial stability. Activity restrictions are 
believed to increase risk-taking behavior if bank activities are not restricted. In doing so, they reduce financial 
stability. Thus, the overall results imply that funding liquidity is more sensitive to changes in bank regulations. 
Moreover, we find that the effect of funding liquidity on the financial crisis is negatively associated with the 
financial crisis, suggesting that the financial instability is more substantial during the recent financial crisis. We 
find significantly negative coefficients for capital, profitability, and inflation. Meanwhile, the coefficients of 
GDP  enter positive. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper investigates whether the effect of funding liquidity on financial stability differs depending on bank 
size and bank regulations, using bank-level data for BRICS countries. To the best of our knowledge, there has 
been little discussion about the direct and indirect effects of funding liquidity on financial stability. A better 
understanding of how funding liquidity affects the financial stability of the banking system is of paramount 
importance for policies related to, in particular, banks operating in emerging economies. In fact, the banking 
system is key players in economic development, especially in emerging economies. The paper uses a sample of 
254 banks working in the BRICS countries from the period between 2005 and 2014. The paper applies two-step 
system GMM estimation techniques. It is worth noting that the empirical results show that coefficients of lagged 
financial stability are statistically significant and positive in all specifications, implying that financial stability 
lasts from one year to subsequent year and, again, there the dynamic effect of financial stability is observed. 
The results reveal that liquidity funding and bank size are significant and negatively associated with 
financial stability at the 5% level of significance, while bank regulations are positively correlated with financial 
stability of the banking system, suggesting that strict capital regulation and supervisory control improve 
financial stability, while less supervisory controls on bank activities also  have significant positive effects on 
the stability. However, in contrast, bank size weakens the stability of banks because the impact of liquidity 
funding on financial stability is negatively associated with the bank size. Moreover, the interaction action effect 
of funding liquidity and financial is more substantial during the recent global financial crisis.  
The findings of this study have a number of policy implications. Firstly, it indicates that the interaction 
effects of funding liquidity, bank regulations and bank size on financial stability are significant, implying that 
bank funding liquidity and financial stability show intricate relationship instead of a linear relationship. 
Secondly, the results support the arguments favoring stricter bank capital requirement, and supervisory controls 
can help constrain the tendency of banks to take excessive risks and mitigate the adverse impacts of bank size 
on financial stability.  Large bank size hurts the stability of the banking industry as it increases greater risk-
taking behavior and leads to an increase in the probability of bank default. This paper underscores the 
importance of further research to examine funding liquidity and financial stability to draw a solid conclusion 
and more banks with similar characteristics. 
 
 
                                                             
1 0.00218=0.001×2.18( standard deviation of bank size) 
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